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Monty Container Hardening (Runtime Enablement)

This guide enables optional seccomp/AppArmor hardening for the Monty execution lane.

Prerequisites

Docker/Compose supports security_opt and profiles.
Host supports seccomp (most modern Linux).
AppArmor (optional) is enabled on the host.

Enable hardened profile (seccomp only)

From repo root:

docker compose \
  -f docker-compose.yml \
  -f infra/compose/docker-compose.monty-hardened.yml \
  --profile monty-hardened \
  up -d

This applies:

seccomp “no-network syscall” blocklist
read-only container filesystem
tmpfs for /tmp and /var/tmp
no-new-privileges
cap_drop=ALL

Enable AppArmor (optional)

Load the profile:

sudo apparmor_parser -r -W infra/apparmor/threegate-monty

Uncomment or add in infra/compose/docker-compose.monty-hardened.yml:

security_opt:
  - apparmor:threegate-monty

Restart the service:

docker compose \
  -f docker-compose.yml \
  -f infra/compose/docker-compose.monty-hardened.yml \
  --profile monty-hardened \
  up -d --force-recreate

Verification

In the Monty container, attempts to open sockets should fail.
Your normal Monty tool requests should still run.

Why this is defense-in-depth

Monty already limits capabilities at the interpreter level, but:

seccomp reduces syscall attack surface
AppArmor adds filesystem and capability controls
read-only root limits persistence

These controls are optional but recommended for higher-assurance deployments.

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